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Glossary 
GDASS:  Gloucestershire Domestic Abuse Support Service 
CBH:  Cheltenham Borough Homes 
CBC: Cheltenham Borough Council 
DHR: Domestic Homicide Review 
SIO: Senior Investigating Officer 
FLO: Family Liaison Officer 
TOR: Terms of Reference 
IMR: Individual Management Review 
GDVSAP: Gloucestershire Domestic Violence Support and Advocacy Service 
MASH: Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cheltenham Strategic Leadership Group is the relevant Community Safety Partnership for the purposes 
of this Domestic Homicide Review and has coordinated the review in-line with the Multi-Agency 
Statutory Guidance for the Conduct of Domestic Homicide Reviews published in August 2013 
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Preface 
I would like to begin this report by expressing my sincere sympathies, and that of the panel, with the 
family and friends of Susan who is remembered as a loving and caring mother and grandmother. Susan 
is remembered universally as a kind, gentle and fun loving person who is keenly missed. I am sorry for 
their loss and hope that in some way this report gives voice to Susan’s story. During the course of this 
review we have kept Susan’s photo visible at panel meetings, and we never forgot that she was a real 
and loved person.  This report has considered the perspective and testimony of family equally alongside 
professional records to better understand what happened and to maximise learning, this is in line with 
Home Office guidance for the conduct of DHRs.   
The purpose of a Domestic Homicide Review (DHR) is to identify improvements which could be made 
to community and organisational responses to victims of domestic abuse, and hopefully to try and 
prevent a tragedy like this from ever happening again.  
I would like to thank the panel, and those who provided chronologies and Individual Management 
Reviews (IMRs), for their time, patience and cooperation. I would also like to thank members of Susan’s 
family for their contribution, and the time they gave to this review. The family have suffered terribly for 
many years and further suffering must be avoided wherever possible. For this reason the report author 
has excluded some information which may identify individuals, like specific dates, and detail of certain 
incidents, and some information the family would like to remain private. Susan and Peter are 
pseudonyms agreed with the family. It is considered by the Chair that Peter may still pose a risk to 
certain members of the family and further suffering must be avoided. 
It is important to remember that this homicide occurred in late 2013, and since this time there have 
been changes to some agency practices and procedures. Notably, there have been significant 
developments in the Police and Housing approaches to Domestic Abuse, and this should be considered 
when reading the chronology of events. 
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1.0 Executive Summary 
1.1 It should be recognised in this case that significant abuse occurred over a forty year period, and 
consequently the summary is longer than might be expected. 
1.2 The victim Susan was a 57 year old woman who lived alone in supported housing in Cheltenham, 
Gloucestershire. She was killed in (date excluded for anonymity) 2013 in her own home when her 
former husband Peter (also 57) strangled her. Her body was discovered in 2013 having 
apparently been deliberately hidden beneath bedding. 
1.3 Susan suffered with serious ill health which affected her life and physical choices. Such was the 
severity of her medical condition, that by 2013 when she died, she was considered to be 
terminally ill. Susan would have found it difficult to walk long distances or exert herself. For this 
reason she was living in housing ordinarily reserved for those over the age of 65. Susan had 
declined to have daily visits from the wardens and was living an independent life. 
1.4 Susan had been married to Peter and they had two children together, a son and a daughter, but at 
the time of her murder they had been divorced for over ten years. The separation had occurred 
because of Peter’s violence and abuse towards Susan, and a reported incident of violence to one of 
the children (when they were 14 years old) for which he was arrested and charged. Susan said in 
interview that she left Peter because Social Services had threatened to take away her children if 
she did not, and she also said that the children were often taking her place as a focus for Peter’s 
violence.  
1.5 Peter continued to use violence against Susan and exert control over her even after she left him. 
There is no doubt that she was very frightened of him and told people she thought he would kill 
her. Her family say ‘she was frightened to death of him’ and ‘she never felt safe anywhere’. It is 
apparent that Peter continued to have a significant presence in her life and despite some 
considerable effort on her part to keep him away; she had little choice but to tolerate his presence 
in her life and home. 
1.6 Susan maintained a close relationship with her children and her wider family. She appeared to 
live a quiet life, which was dominated by Peter and his abuse. She told of violence and threats 
against her family and her children, which made her very frightened to make complaints against 
him. Family members have also told this review of significant control, stalking and abuse by Peter. 
In interviews and a recorded telephone call to police Susan told of becoming more and more 
isolated as Peter threatened her friends and made it impossible for her to have a social life. In 
various records, and conversations with family, she told of beatings, rape and death threats.  
1.7 Susan also had significant housing problems which caused her to move many times to try and 
escape Peter. She spent some time in refuges, notably one in Swindon. In 2005 Susan reported an 
incident had occurred in which Peter put his hands around her throat and strangled her until she 
lost consciousness. Susan reported a further incident of strangulation assault from Peter to the 
police two months later. Given her very serious medical condition which could make breathing 
difficult in ordinary circumstances, her fear that she would be killed is brought into sharp relief.  
1.8 After Susan reported the second strangulation assault, Peter absconded from the UK apparently, 
at some level, to escape justice, spending some considerable time in Thailand. However, he 
returned to the UK and the violence and control began again. He had regular access to Susan’s 
home for contact with his children and grandchildren; he also evidently had some control over 
her finances and those of the children.  
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1.9 The sale of the marital home was the cause of some considerable stress. Susan was too frightened 
to live there, and Peter made it impossible for her to sell it. Family say that ‘he wouldn’t even let 
her have a tea-spoon’ from the house when she left. When it was finally sold after many years he 
attempted to get her share of the money by threat and violence. 
1.10 At some time Peter was in a relationship with another woman, the detail of which is not in the 
scope of this report. But it has been disclosed to the police by this woman that Peter was similarly 
controlling of her and she was very frightened of him.  
1.11 Susan and Peter appeared to have a lot of contact in the last months of her life. Peter reported 
Susan for benefit fraud and she was investigated for that offence in the months before her death.  
1.12 The basis of the accusation was that Susan had benefitted from the sale of the marital home when 
she separated from Peter, but had not declared the money in her formal claims for housing and 
other benefits. 
1.13 Peter made some attempts to withdraw his allegations just before Susan’s death when he realised 
that he was also going to be subject of the investigation as he had also benefitted from the sale of 
the marital home, and had also not declared the money. It is apparent that the situation was 
getting out of Peter’s control and he had started to panic. 
1.14 As a result of these allegations Susan’s housing benefits were suspended, and she reported to 
others that she was having difficulty paying her rent. Cheltenham Borough Homes had started 
processes to seek to take possession of Susan’s home.  
1.15 Family members state that Susan was terrified of the investigation and sincerely believed she 
would go to prison. 
1.16 In late 2013 Susan suddenly failed to turn up for some family engagements with no explanation. 
This was very unlike her, and her family became concerned when they could not make contact. 
They managed to gain entry to her home with the help of the warden at the supported housing 
but did not find Susan there.  
1.17 When approached, Peter told the family that he was in contact with Susan by phone, and that she 
was staying in the West Country. The family were suspicious of this story, and some twenty two 
days after she went missing, police gained entry to her home and discovered her body lying in her 
bed deliberately hidden by bedding and a pillow. She had been strangled.  
1.18 Peter was arrested and charged with murder. He was convicted of murder at Bristol Crown Court 
and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 16 year tariff. Peter denied any involvement in Susan’s 
death throughout the trial. 
1.19 During the course of the relationship, a period of some forty years, Susan had contact with a 
number of agencies and organisations where she disclosed the abuse, and in some examples, 
requested help. She had contact with the police, housing agencies, health services and the housing 
benefit fraud department. 
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2.0 Purpose of the Review, Process, Scope and Terms of Reference 
2.1 The purpose of the review is not to reinvestigate the death or apportion blame, but to establish 
what lessons are to be learned from the domestic homicide, regarding the way in which local 
professionals and organisations work individually and together to safeguard victims, and to 
identify clearly what those lessons are, both within and between agencies.  
2.2 It will establish how those lessons will be acted on, within what timescales, and what is expected 
to change as a result, and then apply those lessons to service responses including changes to 
policies and procedures as appropriate; and to prevent domestic violence homicide and improve 
service responses for all domestic violence victims and their children, through improved intra 
and inter-agency working. 
 
2.3 The Terms of Reference were articulated thus: 
 
2.4 Purpose of the panel: 
To establish the facts about events leading up to the murder of Susan  
 
To examine the roles of the organisations involved in her case, the extent to which she had 
involvement with those agencies, and the appropriateness of single agency and partnership 
responses to her case. 
 
To establish whether there are lessons to be learned from this case about the way in which 
organisations and partnerships carried out their responsibilities to safeguard her wellbeing. 
 
To identify clearly what those lessons are, how they will be acted upon, and what is expected to 
change as a result. 
 
To identify whether, as a result, there is a need for changes in organisational and/or partnership 
policy, procedures or practice in Gloucestershire in order to improve their work to better 
safeguard victims of domestic abuse. 
 
2.5 The scope of the panel review 
 
To produce a chronology of events and actions leading up to the death of the victim, Susan, from 
the period 1st January 1999 until she was discovered deceased in 2013; seeking information from: 
 
 Organisations which had contact with her 
 Local community organisations 
 Her family and friends 
 
To review current roles, responsibilities, policies and practices in relation to victims of domestic 
abuse – to build up a picture of what should have happened 
 
To review this against what actually happened to draw out the strengths and weaknesses 
 
To review national best practice in respect of protecting adults from domestic abuse 
 
To draw out conclusions about how organisations and partnerships can improve their working in 
the future to support victims of domestic abuse 
 
 7 | P a g e  
 
The review will also specifically consider: 
 
An assessment of whether family and friends were aware of any abusive or concerning behaviour 
from the perpetrator to the victim (or other persons). 
 
A review of any barriers experienced by the family in reporting any abuse or concerns, including 
whether they, or the victim, knew how to report domestic abuse had they wanted to. 
 
A review of any previous concerning conduct or a history of abusive behaviour from the 
perpetrator and whether this was known to any agencies. 
 
An evaluation of any training or awareness raising requirements that are necessary to ensure a 
greater knowledge and understanding of domestic abuse processes and / or services in 
Gloucestershire. 
 
Whether the perpetrator had any previous history of abusive behaviour towards this victim, or 
any previous partner, and whether this was known to any agencies. 
 
Whether family and friends wanted to participate in the review.  If so, find out if they were aware 
of any abusive behaviour by the perpetrator prior to the homicide. 
 
Communication to the general public and non-specialist services about available specialist 
services related to domestic abuse or violence. 
 
Whether the work undertaken by the service in this case is consistent with its own: professional 
standards, compliant with its own protocols, guidelines, policies and procedures 
 
Any other information that becomes relevant during the conduct of the review 
 
2.6 The panel was made up of representatives of those organisations that had some involvement in the 
victim's life, those that have duties to care for adults at risk of domestic abuse, and those that have 
local knowledge and insight. 
 
2.7 In the initial scoping a number of agencies were identified as having had contact with Susan and 
Peter and they provided the review panel with a written chronology detailing the nature of that 
contact. Those agencies with significant contact were asked to provide the panel with an Individual 
Management Review (IMR). Significant contact was not measured solely by the amount of that 
contact, but also the importance and relevance of it. The authors of the reviews had no direct 
contact with the case. Chronologies were provided by: 
 
Gloucestershire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (Acute Healthcare Trust) 
Gloucestershire Constabulary 
Gloucestershire County Council - Adult Services 
Gloucestershire County Council Children’s Services 
Gloucestershire Domestic Violence Support and Advocacy Project (GDVSAP)  
Cheltenham Borough Homes 
Cheltenham Borough Council (benefit and fraud investigation) 
Gloucestershire Care Services 
Tewkesbury Borough Council Housing Team 
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IMRs were provided by:  
 Gloucestershire Constabulary  
 Cheltenham Borough Homes  
 Gloucestershire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (Acute Healthcare Trust) 
 Cheltenham Borough Council benefit and fraud investigation department 
 Gloucestershire Care Services 
 
2.8 The authors of the IMRs were in every case independent of any involvement in the case. 
2.9 The IMR authors presented their reports and their recommendations in person to the panel, and 
were available then to answer questions about their agency’s involvement and any 
recommendations they made.  The panel met on at least ten occasions to discuss the antecedent 
history and to consider the IMRs. There was a substantial time period to consider in this case as the 
abuse, control and violence had spanned some forty years. The period for scrutiny of agency 
involvement is restricted to the dates when that involvement is first documented, which is from 
1999. However, family knowledge stretches further back and sets some context so was not 
constrained by the dates set in these terms of reference for agencies. 
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3.0 Timescales 
3.1 The Gloucestershire Safeguarding Adults Board (GSAB) was first informed of the death on the 13th 
September 2013 
3.2 The Independent Chair of the GSAB reviewed the circumstances of the death against the criteria 
set out in the Multi Agency Statutory Guidance for the Conduct of Domestic Homicide Reviews, 
consulting with the domestic abuse strategic lead for Gloucestershire. On 13th September 2013 it 
was recommended that a DHR should be undertaken and the Home Office was informed on the 
same day. 
3.3 In line with Home Office guidance, the review was undertaken by Cheltenham Strategic 
Leadership Group. 
3.4 Cheltenham Strategic Leadership Group was informed in October 2013 and they commissioned 
Dr Jane Monckton Smith to act as the Independent Chair and report author on 3rd December 2013. 
Dr Monckton Smith is a specialist in domestic homicide and works for the University of 
Gloucestershire. She does not work for any of the agencies which had contact with Susan or Peter, 
and she is independent of any agency that had involvement with the case. 
3.5 The review was undertaken in accordance with Home Office guidance and was conducted in such 
a way so as not to compromise or prejudice current and ongoing criminal proceedings. 
3.6 There was a criminal prosecution pending as Peter had been charged with Susan’s murder. It was 
decided that the review could not formally begin until the trial was over, however it was decided 
the panel should meet to draft the Terms of Reference.  
3.7 The panel and Chair formally met for the first time on the 6th December 2013 and the Terms of 
Reference (TOR) were drafted. The Chair was conscious that she wanted the family to have the 
opportunity to review the TOR but at this stage felt it important to produce a draft and seek their 
input at the end of the trial. 
3.8 Susan’s family were invited to be part of the review, and were written to by the Independent 
Chair before the trial, and then again after the trial, to invite their participation. It is not unusual 
for such tragic events to create divisions and hurt within a family, and there were such divisions 
evident in this case. These divisions were made known to the Chair by the Police Family Liaison 
Officer, the Homicide Service, and the Senior Investigating Officer. Susan’s children decided not to 
participate in this review in the beginning, but other members of Susan’s family did. One of 
Susan’s children participated in the review at a later stage in the process. 
3.9 The trial was concluded in late 2014 and Peter was convicted of murder.  
3.10 The chair was unable to meet with the family until after the trial because some members of the 
family were significant witnesses. The first arranged meeting after the trial had to be cancelled 
and re-scheduled because of serious events affecting the family which could not have been 
predicted. The chair was able to meet with them when they were feeling able to contribute in 
February 2015. The scope of the review was discussed with them in detail, and their 
considerations and requests fully integrated into the Terms of Reference and the report. 
3.11 The business of the panel began after the trial in late 2014. An inquest was opened and adjourned 
and will not be continued. There are no other parallel reviews or inquiries. 
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3.12 When the first draft of the Overview Report was completed the Independent Chair contacted 
Susan’s children who had previously decided not to participate in the review, to give them the 
opportunity to see the report before it was submitted to the Home Office, and to contribute if they 
so wished. One of Susan’s children decided after meeting with the Independent Chair that they 
would like to contribute, so submission of the report was again pended to allow this to happen. 
3.13 The Independent Chair had three meetings with Susan’s child and their perceptions and 
experiences were then included in the report. 
3.14 This activity has meant that the report is later being submitted than the stipulated preferred 
timescale referred to in the guidelines. 
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4.0 Methodology 
4.1 The method for conducting a DHR is prescribed by Home Office guidelines. This DHR followed 
those guidelines in the usual way. After the trial, there was no concurrent review, and the 
business of the panel did not formally begin until the trial had ended in 2014. It is important that 
the Independent Chair observe the rules of disclosure which can become difficult if a review 
begins before a trial is ended, especially where family are key witnesses. This observation 
extended the time within which this review was conducted, and the Home Office were informed 
of the delay in beginning. 
4.2 All agencies in the area were contacted to search for any contact they may have had with Susan 
and her immediate family, and also Peter. If there was any contact then a chronology detailing the 
specific nature of the contact was requested. Those agencies with contact considered of 
importance to the panel were asked to provide an Individual Management Review. This allows 
the individual agency to reflect on their dealings with the family and/or the offender and identify 
areas which could be improved in the future, and make recommendations. Upon receipt of the 
chronologies and the IMRs a composite chronology was produced by the Independent Chair.  
4.3 The IMR authors were not directly involved with the case. They all presented their reports to the 
DHR panel and were available then to answer questions about their involvement and the 
recommendations they may have made.  
4.4 In addition to this, Susan’s GP was interviewed by the Independent Chair. A summary of that 
interview was provided to the panel. A recording of a telephone call made to police by Susan was 
played to the Independent Chair and a summary of that conversation was provided to the panel. 
Three interviews under caution between Susan and Cheltenham Borough Council benefits fraud 
department were provided for the panel. 
4.5 The Independent Chair also met with members of Susan’s family at their home address. She met 
with the family on five occasions and with Susan’s child on three occasions, and discussed Susan’s 
life with Peter at length. The family members provided the review with their perceptions and 
experiences of Susan’s life, and records which helped support their narratives. This is in line with 
Home Office guidance for the conduct of DHRs. The family were also provided with a draft of this 
report to read and comment on so further input could be facilitated. The Independent Chair went 
through all of the report with them to answer any queries or questions, and take suggestions. 
4.6 The panel also had a verbal summary and history of the investigation from a representative of 
Gloucestershire Constabulary. The Independent Chair was provided with copies of statements 
from police officers, witnesses, and some statements made by Susan. 
4.7 The Crown Prosecution Service was asked to contribute to the panel to speak more generally 
about the way decisions about charging are reached. The Independent Chair visited the Deputy 
Chief Crown Prosecutor in their Bristol offices to talk about how charging decisions are reached, 
and the kind of training CPS direct, and CPS lawyers receive. This was extremely useful 
information for the panel. 
4.8 All panel members were asked to present their own perspectives on recommendations which 
they thought should be made in the final report. Each of these suggestions was discussed by the 
panel. 
4.9 The panel considered the actions of Gloucestershire Constabulary, Cheltenham Borough Council 
(housing), Tewkesbury Borough Council (housing), Gloucestershire Hospitals NHS Foundation 
Trust (Acute Healthcare Trust), Cheltenham Borough Council benefit fraud investigation 
department, and the GP practice where the victim was registered at the time of her death.  
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5.0 DHR Panel 
5.1 The DHR panel was made up of people who work in a relevant area of the focus for the review and 
local relevant support practitioners and professionals, including charitable organisations. The  
individuals who made up the panel for this DHR were from the following agencies: 
 
Independent chair - University of Gloucestershire 
Cheltenham Borough Homes: 
Cheltenham Borough Council: 
Gloucestershire Constabulary: Detective Inspector 
Gloucestershire Domestic Abuse Support Services: Service Manager 
Oakley Neighbourhood Project: Service Manager 
Gloucestershire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust: 
Infobuzz: 
Gloucestershire County Council - Adult Services: 
6.0 Equality and Diversity 
 
6.1 The panel considered issues of equality and diversity. All nine protected characteristics in the 
2010 Equality Act were considered by the DHR panel and one in particular was found to have 
relevance to this DHR: that was disability. 
6.2 Susan was considered to be suffering from ill health which was terminal. This fact was known 
widely by her friends and family, and Peter was aware of how fragile Susan’s health was. Susan 
was not fit enough to receive the heart and lung transplant she had been assessed as needing. 
6.3 The panel considered questions of vulnerability in this context, but it was stated by the NHS Trust 
and the Police that Susan would not have been considered ‘vulnerable’ according to their 
organisational criteria, based on national guidelines at that time (No Secrets 2000): 
 
A person (over the age of 18) ‘who is or may be in need of community care services by reason of 
mental or other disability, age or illness; and who is or may be unable to take care of him or 
herself, or unable to protect him or herself against significant harm or exploitation’ 
 
6.4 This issue was discussed at some length with the purpose of identifying how ‘vulnerable’ status 
may or may not have changed any services that Susan was receiving.  
6.5 From the NHS perspective, even if Susan had been considered formally vulnerable, it was 
concluded that this would not have changed the care she was receiving. 
6.6 From a police perspective ‘vulnerable’ or ‘intimidated’ victims could receive an enhanced service 
and there is now an obligation on police to identify such vulnerability or intimidation, but this 
was not a statutory obligation during the time span of this case. The Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 defines vulnerable and intimidated witnesses as: 
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Vulnerable witnesses are defined by section 16 YJCEA (1999) as: 
 
All child witnesses (under 18); and 
Any witness whose quality of evidence is likely to be diminished because they: 
 are suffering from a mental disorder (as defined by the Mental Health Act 1983); 
 have a significant impairment of intelligence and social functioning; or 
 have a physical disability or are suffering from a physical disorder 
 
Some disabilities are obvious, some are hidden. Witnesses may have a combination of disabilities. 
They may not wish to disclose the fact that they have a disability during initial and subsequent 
needs assessments. Different witnesses on the autistic spectrum may have very different needs. 
 
Intimidated witnesses are defined by section 17 YJCEA as those suffering from fear or distress in 
relation to testifying in the case. Complainants in sexual offences are defined by section 17(4) as 
automatically falling into this category unless they wish to opt out. Witnesses to certain offences 
involving guns and knives are similarly defined as automatically falling into this category unless 
they wish to opt out 
 
Victims of the most serious crime, as set out in the Victim's Code, might also be regarded as 
intimidated. This includes close relatives bereaved by criminal conduct, victims of domestic 
violence, hate crime, terrorism, sexual offences, human trafficking, attempted murder, kidnap and 
false imprisonment, arson with intent to endanger life and wounding or causing gross bodily harm 
with intent. 
 
Vulnerable and Intimidated Victims were defined under the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999, and this legislation was fully in force by July 2002 (National Archives 
accessed January 2016). So from this perspective Susan could have been considered as 
intimidated. She self-identified to police as an intimidated witness when she said she was too 
scared to testify as a result of domestic abuse and violence. 
 
It was the Victim’s Code which was enacted under the Domestic Violence Crime and Victim’s Act 
2004 which placed a responsibility on police to identify vulnerable or intimidated witnesses. 
This was in force by 2006 though there were no civil or criminal sanctions for non-compliance. 
The legislation was updated again in 2013 and 2015 but these updates are outside the span of 
this review. 
 
6.7 Witnesses who have been identified as intimidated after 2006 would have been entitled to 
‘special measures’ in court. 
 
6.8 This issue is discussed further in the analysis of issues in sections 10.54– 10.56. 
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7.0 Family Background 
7.1 Susan and Peter had two children. Both are now adult and there are two grandchildren. The 
family maintained close contact with each other and would meet regularly. Peter was a problem 
for all members of the family, and they all suffered from his controlling, violent and abusive 
behaviour. A genogram was provided but has been excluded for anonymity 
7.2 There are complexities in the relationships between Peter and his children. There is a 
documented incident of him abusing one of his children from Gloucestershire Constabulary, and 
the NHS Foundation Trust, as well as Susan alleging this herself to Cheltenham Borough Council 
benefit and fraud investigation team. This reported incident of assault against the child is given as 
the reason for Susan finally living apart from Peter.  It has also been reported by the police and 
Susan’s family members that both children were, and still are, afraid of Peter. 
7.3 In a letter from the Child and Family Service provided to this review, and written by a medical 
doctor after an examination of one of the children, there is clear acknowledgement the child was 
‘very frightened’ by the arguments between their parents. It was also acknowledged that the child 
was ‘terrified’ that they would be taken away from Susan. It was advised in the letter that Susan 
and Peter should address the issue. Peter indicated on this occasion that his behaviour was 
problematic and that he would seek ‘anger management’ help. This never happened.  
7.4 The family told the Review that Peter was a man of routine and would impose those routines on 
others, especially Susan.  
7.5 It was alleged by Susan, that Peter had threatened and assaulted members of her family, in order 
to control her. There is evidence in testimony given to this review to suggest that the whole 
family were frightened of Peter and his violence. Family members reported to the Independent 
Chair that they had been threatened, assaulted, suffered criminal damage, and even been 
abducted by Peter over the years. All incidents related to control of Susan. There had been serious 
assaults and injury with weapons, even a machete, and threats with firearms, and this created a 
climate of fear where everyone was frightened of what Peter would do. 
7.6 The fear was such that many of these incidents were not reported to police as the family observed 
that it was their belief, that on many occasions when the police were called, nothing was done. 
7.7 There was a complicating factor in this dynamic and that was that Peter had a relative who was a 
serving police officer in the Gloucestershire Constabulary. Although there is no evidence to 
suggest that this officer in any way behaved in anything other than a professional manner, the 
family were concerned that Peter could find out if they had been contacting the police. 
7.8 There were also problems at the trial with what were possibly conflicted loyalties mixed with 
fear. One of the adult children changed their decision during the trial, to give evidence against 
Peter which was of great importance to the prosecution case, and one adult child attempted to 
give Peter a character reference which caused this adult child some visible distress. Things were 
further complicated when neither adult child was considered vulnerable or intimidated, and so 
did not receive the special measures put in place to help such witnesses. A formal complaint was 
made against Gloucestershire Constabulary relating to this, but was not upheld. This created 
great division and friction within the family. 
7.9 These are frictions all created by Peter and exacerbated by a lack of knowledge of Domestic Abuse 
in some of the agencies involved.  
7.10 The immediate family of Susan were contacted by the Independent Chair and informed that a 
review would take place. When the criminal proceedings were completed the family were 
contacted again to invite their participation in the review. 
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7.11 As a result of the homicide and the family divisions, contact was made separately to Susan’s adult 
children, and to the wider family via two different points of contact, using the Homicide Service, 
and the police Family Liaison Officer. 
7.12 Susan’s adult children at first declined the invitation to participate in this review. This was 
communicated to the Independent Chair through the Homicide Service. This decision was 
respected by the panel and no further contact was made with them until the Overview Report 
was completed.  
7.13 When the report was completed, one of the adult children contributed to the review. 
7.14 Other family members were contacted through the police Family Liaison Officer and they decided 
they did want to participate. The independent chair met with them on five occasions 
7.15 The family were sent information about help they could receive from national charity AAFDA who 
help families with DHRs, and this information was included with the letter they received from the 
Independent Chair. 
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8.0 Chronological Sequence of Events 
8.1 This chronological narrative of Susan’s life is written taking consideration of information drawn 
from official files, organisational records, and personal testimony from Susan recorded in 
interviews and telephone call transcripts, and conversations with her family.  When all these 
sources of information were collated, the chronology, which included health and other data, was a 
large document with much of the content having no direct bearing on the death of Susan. For this 
reason the chronology has been edited to provide information of relevance. This chronology in 
this section of the report is written in narrative form. The panel have highlighted some key 
incidents where they believe more robust intervention could have helped Susan.  
8.2 The Terms of Reference set the timescale for this review as starting from January 1999, however 
it is important that some historical context is provided as the abuse of Susan and her family 
started much earlier. The following paragraph provides an overview and context and family gave 
information outside of the timespan set by the Terms of Reference: 
8.3 Susan and Peter met when both were young people. They lived fairly close to each other in the 
same part of Cheltenham. Family state that Peter was violent and controlling from the very 
beginning. He did not like Susan having contact with anyone but him, and would threaten and 
assault family members if they tried to interfere with his control. There are serious incidents 
recounted of Peter threatening male family members with a gun, abducting one male family 
member in his car and using a shotgun to threaten him. Another family member was attacked 
with a machete and needed significant medical attention to his hand afterwards. The family said 
that the police would turn up when called, and warn Peter to behave himself, but it seemed to 
them it was dealt with in a casual and friendly manner. It appeared to the family as if Peter never 
had to face the consequences of his actions. The family say that quite early on they stopped calling 
the police as they felt nothing was ever done, and it made things much worse for Susan because 
nothing was done. Similarly, Susan stated that Peter would follow her, and if she spoke with 
anyone, he would approach that person afterwards and threaten them. He would tell people not 
to talk to her or be friends with her. It is this context, and a climate of fear, that dominated the 
actions of the whole family in dealing with Peter and Susan. The family state that Susan would 
allow Peter access to her and her life to protect her relatives and her children. Susan actually 
reported that she couldn’t even bear Peter to touch her in the end, but felt she had no choice but 
to allow him in her home and life. 
8.4 (Out of time scale) on the 26th February 1990 one of the children was seen by a doctor because of 
severe behavioural problems which included aggression and violence. The child was considered 
difficult to handle and frightening to other children. Susan reported she could not leave them 
alone even having to take the child to the toilet with her.  
8.5 (Out of time scale) on 20th March 1990 one of the children was taken to casualty for an injury to 
the elbow sustained when Peter ‘tried to prevent them falling out of bed’. 
8.6 On 4th June 1990 (out of time scale) the child with behavioural problems was seen by a play 
therapist. Concerns were raised about their aggressive behaviour.  It is also noted that the child 
would cut at their nails until they bled. This was the last appointment recorded as the child was 
not taken for follow up appointments. It is noted that the therapist did not feel that the child’s 
issues would be gone, but closed the case.  
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8.7 On 8 October 1992 (out of time scale) Child was taken to a clinic after suffering unexplained 
abdominal and other pain. The clinician felt this was due to stress and tension. 
8.8 Key Incident: (out of time scale) on the 15th May 1995 one of the children attended a medical 
assessment for behavioural and anxiety problems. The doctor noted that ‘it was only when I saw 
(child) on their own that they were able to tell me that they were very frightened by the arguments 
mummy and daddy were having. These sound as though they include an element of physical abuse. 
(Child) is terrified that their mother will leave, and told me that in the last argument the father had 
said that the child would have to go into a children’s home. (Child) was determined to stay off school 
the next day to make sure they stayed with the mother’. In this consultation the medical 
practitioner notes that she had secured a promise from Peter to sign up for anger management 
classes. It was also said in this session that Peter and Susan had said to the children that ‘they 
couldn’t stop arguing straight away but would work on it’.  
8.9 Key Incident: On the 19th February 2000 it is reported by police that Peter beat one of his 
children repeatedly with a leather belt. The injuries are described in official notes as causing 
welts and bruising to the upper back, lower back, backside and legs. It is documented that Peter’s 
reason for beating his child was for punishment because the child had gone out without 
permission. Peter was arrested and charged with ABH. He was remanded to appear in court the 
following day. The complaint was withdrawn by Susan and the child after Peter volunteered to 
have private anger management classes. He did not attend any classes. 
8.10 At the time, and as a result of this assault, Susan reported years of abuse to the police and it is 
documented that information and advice was given to her by them. It is not known what the 
advice was.  
8.11 On 17th February 2001 one of the children was treated for injuries arising out of an incident 
which we have been asked to keep redacted from this report because it is of a private nature. This 
incident was serious enough that the child was referred for follow up to child and family services. 
This child explained that their parents had separated and that they were staying with their father, 
Peter. The child wanted to go and live with Susan but was told that because of Susan’s housing 
circumstances and financial situation, this was not possible. The reality of the situation was 
reported to the panel by family that Peter would not allow Susan to have custody of her children. 
It is alleged in testimony from Susan also, that Peter made it impossible for her to have custody of 
the children at that time. 
8.12 In the patient assessment of this child, there is a history of what are described as ‘accidents’. The 
family were told that the child needed to stay at the hospital but the child was taken away by 
Peter against medical advice. On forming contact with Susan to inform her that there should be a 
visit with family services, the hospital was told that the child was with Susan at her home. The 
paediatrician involved wrote ‘I do not see a protection issue as both parents involved and clearly 
concerned’. There is no record of the outcome in hospital or family services records except that 
the appointment was not kept. 
8.13 The agency records for this time are only partial and fragmented. What can be gleaned from 
various sources, including Susan’s own testimony, is that there were times when she stayed in 
refuges, had panic alarms, and took out non-molestation orders. It is also alleged by Susan that 
Peter threatened to hurt the children and other family members if she did not do as she was told. 
8.14 On the 6th December 2004 Police reported a ‘verbal argument’ between Susan and Peter. Susan 
reported that when she tried to call a taxi to leave from a meeting with Peter he grabbed the 
phone from her, pulled her hair and punched her in the side of the head. Susan reported to police 
that she was too frightened of Peter to pursue a complaint. This incident was closed by police as 
No Further Action (NFA). The officer reports that there were no visible injuries to Susan and as 
 18 | P a g e  
 
such this was recorded as a ‘common assault’. At the time there was no power for police to arrest 
for common assault. Susan was signposted to an advocacy organisation.  
8.15 On 8th April 2005 Susan reported to police via a 999 call that she was receiving unwanted contact 
from Peter. At this point they had been separated for some years. She said she was receiving 
threatening text messages and telephone calls. Susan reported that she found the contact 
distressing and was frightened. Peter was to be issued with a harassment warning. However, this 
was not done. 
8.16 Susan further reported in May and June 2005 that Peter was continuing to send messages. It is 
recorded on the 3rd June 2005 that police intended to issue the harassment warning which was 
still pending from April. 
8.17 Key Incident: On the 17th June 2005 Susan reported to police that on the 7th June 2005, Peter had 
strangled her to unconsciousness. She said she woke to find him splashing water in her face to 
bring her round.  
8.18 Susan was given a panic alarm as a result of this report and police originally classified this assault 
as attempted murder. It was later reclassified by detectives as an ABH which is a lesser assault. 
8.19 Her allegation was corroborated by one of her adult children and a friend who said they saw 
black bruises covering her neck.  
8.20 Key Incident: On the 20th August 2005 Susan activated her panic alarm and reported that Peter 
had tried to strangle her again, causing her nose to bleed. Susan had managed to escape the 
assault and run to her neighbour’s home. Whilst trying to escape Peter had attempted to drag her 
back causing cuts and bruises to her knees, feet, elbows and hands. Susan was reported to be 
wearing ‘baby doll’ pyjamas and no shoes in some testimony. However, in other testimony from 
witnesses she was reported as naked.  
8.21 No statements were taken from the neighbours at the time. Police state the neighbours refused to 
give statements, the witnesses say they weren’t asked to give statements. Statements were given 
about this incident after the homicide in 2014. 
8.22 Police reports show activity to try and arrest Peter with Susan’s co-operation as a result of these 
incidents. The police report states that Susan is ‘frightened to death’ of Peter. 
8.23 Police records from 15th September 2005 indicate further reports from Susan of harassment from 
Peter, and that he was making attempts to try and find out where she was living.  
8.24 On the 16th September 2005 Susan applied for a civil non-molestation order and this was granted 
with a power of arrest attached. 
8.25 On the 26th October 2005 a detective constable was tasked with investigating Peter. He made 
numerous attempts to arrest him without success. Peter is reported to have been staying in 
Thailand at this time. The detective reports that Peter’s adult children were uncooperative, but 
that he considered that one of the adult children was frightened of Peter. 
8.26 On the 15th August 2006 Susan called police to say that Peter was back in the UK. 
8.27 On the 16th August 2006 Susan retracted her statement of assault when police visited her. 
8.28 Peter was finally arrested on 20th August 2006 at the airport when he attempted to re-enter the 
UK.  
8.29 Key Incident: After being interviewed under caution Peter told police that he had not attempted 
to strangle Susan but had pushed her.  He did admit to sending harassing text messages. The 
interviewing officer said that he believed the assault amounted to a push, and that the harassment 
was a series of abusive text messages. 
8.30 On the 18th October 2006 Peter was given a formal caution for Common Assault and harassment 
in relation to the two incidents involving allegations of strangulation. 
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8.31 On the 9th December 2006 Susan spoke with the local domestic violence agency GDVSAP after 
being referred by police. Susan spoke of continuing harassment from Peter on his return to the 
UK. GDVSAP advised that she keep a log of harassment and call them again should she require any 
help. Susan never called back. 
8.32 Key Incident: On the 19th May 2007 Susan reported to police that following an argument, Peter 
had stolen her car keys and taken her car. He returned the keys later but would not tell her where 
the car was. Police state that ‘due to circumstances’ Peter was not arrested, nor a statement taken 
from Susan at the time. An appointment was made to take a statement at a later date. On the later 
date Susan retracted her allegation saying that if she continued with the allegation then her 
relationship with her children would be damaged. 
8.33 On the 8th June 2007 Susan made an application for housing on the basis that she was a victim of 
domestic violence and homeless. She said she was living with her brother. Her claims of DV were 
supported by recorded contact with the police. 
8.34 On the 29th June 2007 Susan was declared ‘not homeless’ by Tewkesbury Borough Council. 
8.35 On the 4th July 2007 Tewkesbury Borough Council interviewed Susan and came to the conclusion 
that it was not clear whether she was a current victim of domestic abuse. Susan became 
distressed at this time and tried to retract her claim that she was a victim of domestic violence, 
because it seemed to her that this claim was actually getting in the way of her application. She 
said she was homeless due to financial difficulties. She also objected strongly to being 
investigated by Tewkesbury Borough Council. 
8.36 On the 23rd October 2007 Susan reported to police that Peter was outside her flat. No offences 
were disclosed according to police records most of which are no longer available. 
8.37 On the 28th February 2008 Susan said to her clinical care specialists that she was living with her 
brother and his wife. Susan was referred to the Heart Failure Nurse Community Team.  
8.38 On the 14th April 2008 Susan requested support from Adult Services of Gloucestershire County 
Council with her finances, and also requested help from a social worker because of housing, 
money and health problems. 
8.39 During the next couple of months it seems that Susan received lots of bad news about her health. 
She was told by her cardiologist that she was not suitable for the heart and lung transplant that 
she needed. She also reported depression and what are described as ‘ongoing issues with her ex-
husband’. 
8.40 Key Incident: On the 28th September 2009 Susan reported to police that Peter had been into her 
home and stolen her mobile phone. He had secreted it in a newspaper and left. She reported that 
this action was all part of control being exerted over her by Peter. She told the officer she had 
moved around a lot because of domestic abuse from Peter. 
8.41 By the 9th October 2009 Peter had not been located and Susan withdrew her complaint, but said 
she wanted him spoken to by police. Peter was spoken to on the telephone about the theft, but 
denied it. 
8.42 On the 15th October 2009 a civil non-molestation order was granted in court. Police state that the 
order was discharged at a hearing on the 9th December 2009, but there are no records which tell 
why this happened. 
8.43 On the 16th March 2011 Susan made a housing application based on her medical needs. Her 
condition was described as stable, but terminal. Her current private landlord would not allow her 
to make changes to the property to help with her condition. 
8.44 On the 15th June 2011 Susan contacted police and reported that whilst she was on holiday for two 
weeks, that Peter had been staying in her home and on her return was refusing to leave. Peter 
was taken home and it is reported that no offences were disclosed. 
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8.45 Between August 2011 and October 2011 Susan was pursuing her application for housing as she 
was finding day to day living was getting more difficult. She was assessed as suitable for sheltered 
housing. A benefits review was also carried out. 
8.46 Key Incident: On the 22nd October 2011 Susan reported to police that Peter was refusing to leave 
her home and threatening her life. Susan said she had gone to her sister-in-law’s house to get 
away from him and that she was frightened he would find out where she was and cause problems 
for her family. The police narrative from the attending officers gave no hint that they considered 
she was in danger. One officer described Susan as intoxicated, and as giving mixed messages to 
Peter. It is stated that this was not a domestic incident in the log. Susan and Peter were both 
warned about their behaviour. No risk assessment was performed and no action was taken. It 
does not appear that a history of domestic abuse was considered. It is reported that the 
suggestion that Susan was drunk and slurring her words is not supported by the telephone 
recording. It is stated by police however, that Susan could have become intoxicated between the 
phone call and police attendance. It should be noted here that intoxication should not be 
considered an indication that the victim’s allegations are untrue, or that the level of risk is 
diminished.  
8.47 Key Incident: On the 19th January 2012 at 2247hrs Susan made a phone call to the 
Gloucestershire Police contact centre. She requested a visit from the Domestic Violence team. She 
spoke to the officer about threats and abuse she had received that evening from Peter and told of 
locking herself in and being terrified. She said she just wanted the abuse to stop. She said she had 
lost faith in the police to do anything, and that Peter always made it look as if she was making up 
the abuse, and she felt that police believed him. Susan cried during the call and was clearly worn 
down and frightened. She said she was a prisoner. The officer appeared sympathetic but asked 
her if she was ‘encouraging’ Peter to keep contacting her. The officer then told her that if she had 
any further problems she should ring 999 and that an officer would call on her after the next day. 
No-one attended at that time to speak to Susan. 
8.48 An officer attended the next day and Susan was assessed as Standard Risk and comments from 
police that Peter was ‘invited’ into her home suggest a fundamental misunderstanding of 
domestic abusers and domestic abuse victims. No DASH form can be located for this visit. 
8.49 On the 7th May 2012 Susan moved into sheltered housing. 
8.50 On the 2nd August 2012 Peter reported Susan for housing benefit fraud 
8.51 Key Incidents: On the 7th January 2013 Susan was interviewed under caution with reference to 
benefit fraud. 
8.52 She was interviewed again on the 6th February 2013 
8.53 She was interviewed again on the 22nd February 2013 
8.54 During these interviews Susan talked of the abuse and violence from Peter, and his financial 
abuse too. 
8.55 Key Incident: The fraud investigation prompted the benefits office to stop Susan’s housing 
benefit. She could not work because of her ill health, and was thus threatened with eviction and 
homelessness. This created great stress for her in the last months of her life and her fears and 
anxiety were not always recognised by any of the agencies involved.  
8.56 Peter had instigated the fraud investigation by alleging that Susan had money from the sale of 
their marital home which she had not declared when claiming benefits. Susan claimed in 
interview under caution to the investigating agency that Peter controlled the money she had, and 
that she regularly gave lump sums to him. She did not know it was Peter who had made the 
allegations. 
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8.57 Peter inadvertently implicated himself in fraud, as he had received a sum of money from sale of 
the marital home which he had not declared. It appeared that towards the end of Susan’s life the 
impending investigation and its consequences were resting heavily on her. She had consulted her 
GP about the anxiety, depression and panic attacks she was experiencing, and talked of her fear 
over the investigation. There is no reference at all in the GP notes of domestic abuse. 
8.58 It seems also that Peter tried to retract his allegations on realising that he too would be 
investigated. He made calls from Susan’s home asking if anything could be done to stop the 
investigation. It seems that the impending fraud investigation was creating stress, albeit self-
inflicted, on Peter too. On the 7th May 2013 Peter was invited to an interview under caution to be 
held on the 14th May. He did not attend. 
8.59 On (date removed for anonymity) 2013 Peter was in Susan’s flat. Susan had reported that he was 
gaining access by ringing the communal bell and being let in by her neighbours. 
8.60 At some point during that day or evening Peter hit Susan in the side of her head, then put his 
hands around her throat and squeezed, the post mortem report suggests that he would have 
squeezed for at least ten seconds. He killed Susan. 
8.61 It is alleged that he may have stayed overnight in the flat with Susan’s body. 
8.62 Susan’s body was discovered by police some three weeks later. Her body was lying in her bed, 
hidden by a duvet and pillow. 
8.63 After killing her, Peter took her car and sold it, and tried to make everyone believe that she was 
still alive. He had plans to flee the country to try and evade prosecution for Susan’s murder. 
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9.0 Trial 
9.1 The trial was held at Bristol Crown Court. In all the trial was started three times due to problems 
not completely unrelated to Peter’s abusive and violent nature. 
9.2 The prosecuting barrister presented a case which represented Susan as someone who could not 
live without Peter, it was said ‘she couldn’t live with him, and couldn’t live without him’. They told 
the jury that Susan chose to let Peter into her home and her life and sometimes gave mixed 
messages. At one point in the first trial Susan was described as possibly ‘foolish’ for ‘allowing’ 
contact with Peter. This is an unfortunate representation of Susan’s life and does not demonstrate 
the fear Susan had of Peter, his brutal violence against her and her family, or the lack of choice she 
had about his presence in her life.  
9.3 Forensic narratives are powerful rhetorical tools and have an enduring presence in the official 
record of a domestic homicide. It is important therefore that domestic abuse is fully understood 
by prosecutors, and the constraints it places on victims of it properly articulated in the narrative 
to aid in better understanding for the future, and to help prevent domestic homicide. 
9.4 The prosecution case put together by Gloucestershire Police relied heavily on circumstantial 
evidence as there was little forensic evidence, and no direct witnesses to the strangulation. It was 
also complicated by Peter’s complete denial of any involvement and the reluctance of some 
witnesses to events after the homicide, to give evidence in court. However, the case was 
meticulously investigated and the subsequent chronology of circumstantial evidence was of 
sufficient strength to convince the jury of Peter’s guilt. 
9.5 Peter was found guilty of murder and sentenced to life with a tariff of sixteen years before being 
eligible for parole. The jury took less than three hours to reach a verdict. 
9.6 The Judge said to Peter ‘you displayed jealousy, possessiveness and a need for control…but your 
anger with her was such that you intended to kill her. Even if you didn’t, she was a slight, frail and 
vulnerable woman, who suffered from heart and lung problems’ 
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10.0 Analysis 
10.1 ‘The key question in evaluating the service response is whether it addresses the perpetrator’s 
violence and whether it increases the safety of the women and children living with domestic violence 
as well as responding to the separate needs of the children and their mothers’ (Stanley and 
Humphreys 2006). 
10.2 The chronology and supporting documents have provided a good overview of Susan’s life. There 
are consistencies in agency responses to Susan which cannot be separated from her lack of faith 
and trust in the help available. Forty years ago there was less knowledge and training in domestic 
abuse and coercion and control, but this review has found that attitudes were remarkably similar 
across agencies and across the time span. Specifically, agencies did not appear to always 
recognise domestic abuse, and even where they did, they did not appreciate the high risk 
characteristics present. 
10.3 It should also be considered that even if policy and practice was different at the beginning of this 
story of domestic abuse, that the victim and family members will have memories of how those 
policies worked, which they carry to their present perceptions of public sector agencies. Because 
the family, and the victim, considered they experienced a lack of action from agencies, this 
inhibited them in continuing to seek action, and a lack of trust that the police would act 
effectively, made them frightened to stand up to Peter. 
10.4 All agencies should consider that historical policies and practices may have current effect 
and approach domestic abuse victims with that knowledge in mind. It is not enough to 
merely acknowledge that things are different now; this must be considered in all dealings with 
domestic abuse victims. 
10.5 It has been explicitly stated by family members that they believe that if something had been done 
earlier then the tragedy may have been avoided. 
10.6 As there was such consistency across agencies, this analysis has considered agency responses 
together, rather than separately, and written as a chronology to enable a fuller picture to emerge. 
10.7 This chronology began with documenting some of the medical records of one of Susan’s children. 
It can be clearly seen that the child was presenting with significant behavioural problems, which 
are documented as being related to domestic violence by one doctor and that physical symptoms 
were related to stress and tension by another doctor. It is acknowledged that these records are 
over twenty years old and it would be easy to assume, that these clear indications that 
intervention might be needed, would be picked up by clinicians now. The panel did consider this 
very problem and as will be further discussed, we were not totally convinced that clinicians from 
many specialisms, always recognise the serious nature of domestic abuse, even now. This 
includes Paediatricians and General Practitioners. Notwithstanding that the reports are historical, 
it should be considered that there are still gaps in provision for children who are witnessing, or 
who are direct victims of, domestic abuse.  
10.8 In these records, at this point, Peter acknowledges that he has a problem which he identifies as 
being his bad temper. He agrees, in response to problems with his child, that he needs anger 
management classes. Though he never takes these up, it is a clear point where intervention could 
have been manipulated with Peter’s consent. He appeared more willing to acknowledge his 
behaviour in this context, than in response to his treatment of Susan. The next stage in the 
chronology is another time which raises the same learning point. 
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10.9 Key Incident: On the 19th February 2000 it is reported by police that Peter beat one of his 
children repeatedly with a leather belt. Again here, in response to a problem with his child, Peter 
agrees to attend anger management classes. Again he does not independently follow this up and 
does not attend any classes. Agencies do not follow this up, and police agree to suspend any 
potential prosecution, apparently because the complaint was withdrawn. This is a clear point at 
which intervention could have been crucial for Susan and her children. The intervention could 
have come from either the police or the hospital, or both. There does not appear to be any link 
between the medical records of this child, which link the issue of them living with domestic abuse, 
and then being subject of a serious assault. Neither do police continue with a prosecution for such 
an assault on a child.  
10.10 On 17th February 2001 one of the children was treated for an incident which we have kept 
redacted from this report because it is of a private nature. This is another point where an 
intervention could have been helpful. However, as noted, in the patient assessment of this child, 
there is a history of what are described as ‘accidents’, but the paediatrician involved wrote ‘I do 
not see a protection issue as both parents involved and clearly concerned’. If this incident had been 
linked to the prior known history of abuse, and the previous behavioural issues, there is a 
possibility that the paediatrician could have come to a different conclusion, but this is speculation. 
However, given the child’s age and the nature of the incident, and the fact that the child was taken 
from the hospital by Peter before being properly discharged, a referral to children’s services 
should have been followed up. This incident appears to be a pivotal time when intervention could 
have had an impact. There is concern noted in records that there had been numerous visits to the 
hospital by this child, and it was known by other agencies that there had been an injury caused by 
an assault by the father. The conclusion by the paediatrician that there was no concern is not 
helpful. Discussions on this aspect by the panel revolved around whether a similar decision could 
be made by a paediatrician now. It was concluded that due to the hierarchies in NHS staffing that 
a paediatrician may not be challenged about their decisions, and there is no automatic referral in 
such cases to children’s services. This may then be a training issue for paediatric staff in hospitals. 
10.11 It was also considered that specialist services and help for children in families where there is an 
abusive parent are limited. In consideration of this point two key problems were considered. The 
first is a concern articulated by Susan’s family that the children became facilitators for the abuse 
against Susan. Not only did Peter threaten to hurt them, they also behaved in a way which placed 
significant pressure on Susan to keep the family together. The family told of Peter’s various 
methods of control of the children. For example, Peter would buy extravagant gifts for them 
without Susan’s knowledge, and then take the gifts away when they displeased him. One child 
was even bought a pony which was a lever for many things. The family said that on at least one 
occasion when the police went back some time after a complaint, the children would be used to 
‘emotionally blackmail’ Susan to withdraw her statement. This review cannot say why or how the 
children were used to facilitate access and abuse, but fear and conflicted loyalties are clear 
possibilities. The second consideration is the trauma suffered by those children witnessing abuse 
and violence towards a parent. There is a specific need identified for children’s support services. 
10.12  The panel is aware that there is some county-wide commissioned support for children 
experiencing domestic abuse through an arts-based programme, but whilst this is valuable, this 
provision does not provide specialist support to equip children with the tools to process and cope 
with what they are witnessing.  
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10.13 The panel sought information about potential services and/or schemes available for children 
witnessing or suffering domestic abuse, especially at a younger age, between seven and twelve.  
There are programmes and services available including nurturing circles, inclusion of domestic 
abuse in the school curriculum, and the PINK (People In The Know) framework. Professionals in 
schools reported that the nurturing circles were particularly helpful for all sorts of problems, and 
professionals from local services reported that they have the training and the programmes to run, 
but have in recent years suffered from a lack of funding. 
10.14  In terms of the chronology the aforementioned incidents would appear to be the last point at 
which domestic abuse is reported to health agencies as a problem for the children.  
10.15 The next documented incidents are with the police, beginning with a report of an assault on Susan 
by Peter in December of 2004, by which time they had separated. The assault is described as a 
verbal argument, despite an allegation of violence. It is stated in the records that Susan said she 
was too frightened of Peter to pursue a complaint. The police state that there were no visible 
injuries so now power to proceed with a s47 assault charge for which there is a power of arrest. 
At this time there was no power of arrest attached to the offence of common assault. The police 
could still have reported Peter for a common assault even if they did not arrest him, but they 
made the decision to take no further action (NFA). However, they did tell Susan about the local 
domestic abuse service. This incident log tends to support the family assertion that Peter’s 
behaviour was not robustly challenged by police officers.  
10.16 In April 2005 Susan called police again via a 999 call and reported harassment from Peter. She 
told police of threatening messages and clearly stated that she was frightened. It may not have 
been common knowledge at this time, but low level harassment and repeated threatening 
messages are an indication of risk in domestic abuse. However, the police did say that Peter 
would be issued with a harassment warning, although this was not done. 
10.17 Susan further reported in May and June 2005 that Peter was continuing to send the messages. 
Police said they would issue the harassment warning pending from the previous reports. It is not 
known why this was not done as there are no records which document this. However, it may have 
appeared to Susan that the police were not taking her complaints seriously. The danger for Susan 
was escalating at this point, and more high risk behaviours were being reported to police.  
10.18 Key Incident: On the 17th June 2005 Susan reported to police that on the 7th June 2005 Peter had 
strangled her to unconsciousness. She said she woke to find him splashing water in her face to bring 
her round. After this report the police are clearly giving the risk to Susan more consideration and 
she was issued with a panic alarm. At first, the report was considered as possibly an attempted 
murder, but after being considered by detectives it was decided that the evidence better fit a 
lesser assault which was a s47 ABH. There was black bruising noted to her neck by witnesses and 
there was clear risk noted by police. There is a power of arrest attached to a s47 assault but this 
was not used in this case. It is also noted that even though the offence of attempted murder may 
be difficult to prosecute because of the intent aspect which must be proved, better evidence 
gathering may have given more choices in charging options. It is acknowledged by police and 
prosecutors that ABH is often charged because the presence of bruises is easier to ‘prove’. Simple 
photographic evidence will support this charge. Strangulation assaults are however, extremely 
high risk and are known to predict future homicide. In many States in the USA strangulation 
assaults must be charged as a felony (serious offence), rather than a misdemeanour (less serious 
offence), so their high risk nature is recognised in the Criminal Justice System. Evidence gathering 
for more serious charges can be improved through training in interviewing witnesses and victims 
in the special characteristics of a strangulation assault. There are things which happen to the 
victim which can be documented and even corroborated by clinicians. Even though this 
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strangulation assault was ten years ago, police and CPS have reported to this review that they are 
still charging most of these types of assault as s47 ABHs. It is possible that a s21 strangulation 
assault charge may also be considered. Police could also consider special strangulation evidence 
gathering aids to help in this process. 
10.19 Key Incident: Things continued to escalate and in August 2005 Susan activated her panic alarm 
and reported that Peter had tried to strangle her again, such was the severity of this attack it 
caused her nose to bleed. The assault continued outside the house as Susan attempted to get to 
safety. In addition to the panic alarm activation, the police were also called by Susan’s neighbours. 
This incident has raised different accounts of police action. The neighbours claim in speaking to 
Susan’s family, and in a statement to the murder enquiry, that they were never asked to provide 
statements in relation to this incident. The police officers state that the neighbours refused to give 
statements. The fact is that no statements were taken from the neighbours. It is also alleged that 
Susan was naked when she ran for help, and that she was in this state of undress when her 
daughter arrived. Susan said that she was so ashamed that her neighbours had seen her like this 
that she wanted to move away. Police state they made numerous attempts to arrest Peter as a 
result of these assaults, and also state that Susan was ‘frightened to death of Peter’. These are now 
known to be very high risk indicators for future homicide – the harassment, the strangulation 
assaults, the previous violence and the terror of the victim are noted in international research to 
be risk markers. There were at least two officers at the second allegation of assault who could 
have given statements as to the state of the victim - her state of dress, her emotional state, the 
injuries to her feet, elbows, hands and knees, the blood on her clothes/body and the blood left on 
the bedding belonging to the neighbours. In analysis it must be considered that intimidated 
witnesses, police witnesses, and other evidence could potentially have been given more attention, 
especially as there was already a panic alarm in place and a high risk history according to police 
records. 
10.20 The commonly used Risk Identification Checklist now in use in Gloucestershire, is the DASH Risk 
checklist, which was not in use in 2005. This checklist was in general use across much of the UK in 
2009. However, it appears the high risk markers are still not always recognised by agencies in 
general, and more awareness is needed so that they can be identified and responded to 
adequately. Susan continued to report harassment from Peter, and she managed to obtain a civil 
non molestation order, but the police failed to locate him for arrest. By October Peter is 
reportedly in Thailand. Police note in records at this time that the children also seem frightened 
of Peter and are uncooperative. These comments tend to suggest that police are recognising the 
potential that these witnesses are intimidated by Peter. 
10.21 In August 2006 Susan called police to say that Peter was back in the UK and police visited her to 
obtain a new statement about the assaults for which he was wanted. Family state that Susan 
thought she was being asked to make the complaint all over again and this frightened her. The 
family state that because of this she said she did not want to make the complaint, they feel this 
was understood by the police as a retraction, and may well have been articulated as such by 
Susan at the time. 
10.22  The family state that at this time Susan had been living a much more relaxed life. She did not have 
the constant harassment from Peter as he was in Thailand, and she had freedom to see her family 
and friends. When she found out that Peter was coming back, they state that she suddenly 
changed and became very fearful. They say this was compounded by the police visit. 
10.23 Peter was finally arrested on 20th August 2006 at the airport when he attempted to re-enter the 
UK and was questioned under caution about the strangulation assaults. This is another key 
opportunity for intervention. Peter said in interview that he had only pushed Susan and had not 
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tried to strangle her. This is in contradiction to the evidence where it is clearly stated that black 
bruising was noted on Susan’s neck. Peter admitted to harassment however, possibly because 
there was evidence of that harassment in the text messages. Police decided to give Peter a formal 
caution for common assault and harassment. There was evidence available to support a more 
serious charge for these assaults than common assault, which sits at the bottom of the hierarchy 
of assaults. According to witnesses there was evidence for at least a s47 ABH if statements and 
photographs had been taken. 
10.24 Even after this Peter continued to harass Susan. After being referred by police to GDVSAP a local 
domestic abuse support agency, Susan was advised by them to keep a log of the harassment. She 
never went back to this agency, it is not known why.  
10.25 The harassment continued into 2007 and Susan made a report to police that Peter had stolen her 
car. Police did not take a statement from Susan at the time, and he was not arrested. An 
appointment was made to take a statement from Susan at a later date. It was at this later time that 
Susan retracted her complaint. Looking back at this incident a couple of things are notable, first 
that the report of a stolen car, with an identified offender, perhaps should have been treated more 
seriously and it is probably the ‘domestic’ nature of the incident which could have been the 
reason for the downgraded response. However, Susan was repeatedly experiencing her 
complaints and distress treated as non-serious by agencies. Secondly, she had a true belief, and 
this is recorded, that she felt there was nothing she could do to manage the danger presented by 
Peter. She felt it was actually quite dangerous to pursue complaints when nothing was happening. 
It was safer to withdraw the complaint. In this incident, it is perhaps clear that the danger was not 
recognised. Had the police attended and taken a statement immediately there may have been 
another opportunity to get Peter into custody and a chance to respond more robustly to the 
situation. It may be advisable that domestic abuse related incidents are responded to quickly, and 
statements taken quickly along with gathering of evidence to support the complaint. Susan also 
said, in relation to this incident, that she was withdrawing her complaint because she was 
worried that her relationship with her children would be damaged. Statements like this reveal the 
complex pressures placed on victims of domestic abuse which reduce the choices they have to 
take action or help. Where children are used as a weapon, and in addition those children are not 
receiving support, abusers have increased power to control everyone in the situation. 
10.26 On the 8th June 2007 when Susan made an application for housing on the basis that she was a 
victim of domestic violence and homeless, another opportunity for intervention was possibly 
missed. Susan was again asking for help. There was a history recorded with the police, and with 
health authorities which would support her claims. It is unfortunate that the housing agency 
involved decided that she was not ‘homeless’, and they also decided that it could not be proved 
that she was a current victim of domestic abuse. Records suggest that Susan became very 
distressed and frustrated at this conclusion. In fact records suggest that Susan was considered 
difficult in her response. When the full picture is put together it is easy to understand why Susan 
was so very upset and frustrated. The historical documentation does suggest a lack of 
understanding in the agency of domestic abuse. Housing was a recurring problem in Susan’s life. 
Housing was used to control and abuse her. Peter made it impossible for her to live in, or sell the 
marital home. This meant that Susan was, in her own words, ‘in a catch-22 situation’. When her 
health is considered in this context and her inability to work, her housing problems were clearly 
serious. She lived with her brother for two years, unable, because of Peter, to have her own home. 
She was apparently given poor advice to not declare her part ownership of the marital home in 
order to qualify for housing, and this created more problems for her. 
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10.27 Susan does have contact over the next couple of months with police and health agencies. Her 
health was fragile and she was asking for help with her finances, housing, health, but also 
‘ongoing problems’ with Peter. 
10.28 The next Key Incident recorded, occurred in September 2009 when Susan reported to police that 
Peter had been into her home and stolen her mobile phone. Again she reported the domestic 
abuse to the officer but Peter was only spoken to on the phone by police about the theft and Susan 
ended up withdrawing her complaint again. 
10.29 Susan did at this time manage to obtain a civil non-molestation order. It was however discharged 
not long afterwards, but no documentation exists to say why. It is clear that in taking out a civil 
order that Susan was trying to manage the situation, and manage Peter’s control. There is no 
agency supporting her, and she was still trying to protect her family from him. Her health at this 
time was getting worse, and family report that she was very frightened that she did not have long 
to live. 
10.30 By June 2011 Susan had her own accommodation but Peter was still harassing her. She contacted 
police to report that he would not leave her flat.  Police did attend but state that no offences were 
disclosed. These problems are compounded by the fact that on numerous occasions police 
approached calls for help or service only from the perspective of identifying criminal offences. It 
is often said that there were ‘no offences identified’ as an explanation for no further action. Police 
have a wider safeguarding responsibility which extends beyond identifying criminal offences. 
This is at least protection of life. Even where police were failing to identify criminal offences, they, 
and other agencies, could have been more pro-active in safeguarding Susan and the children. 
10.31 At this point in time the DASH risk assessment checklist was in use but there is no record that a 
risk assessment was done. Given the history in this story, a risk assessment, if done, may have 
revealed the danger that Susan was in. This is especially so when she called police again when he 
wouldn’t leave her flat in October 2011, but also claims that he was threatening her life. This was 
a clear missed opportunity for intervention. Susan clearly states she is frightened that Peter will 
harm her family; she also states he has threatened her life. This incident was not treated as 
serious by police. Police state in their report that Susan was ‘intoxicated’ and was giving ‘mixed 
messages’ to Peter, and that this was not a domestic incident. There are two clear issues here, 
first; even if Susan had been intoxicated (though this is not supported), this does not mean a 
victim is untruthful, neither does it reduce the risk to the victim. Secondly, the clear danger 
presented to Susan was not recognised, and the opportunity for a proper risk assessment 
interview was not taken. The family were particularly upset by this assessment of the situation 
and were very clear that they would like it to be in this report that intoxication should not mean 
withdrawal of proper service. 
10.32 Susan had clearly reached a very low point in January 2012 when she called the Gloucestershire 
Constabulary Contact Centre. In this call, which was played to the Independent Chair, Susan asks 
for a visit from the domestic violence team. She disclosed that she was suffering violence and 
abuse, but that the police just kept believing Peter. She was crying and distressed. She said that no 
matter what she did nothing stopped him and that she considered herself a prisoner. Although 
the officer was sympathetic he clearly did not understand the seriousness of the situation, and 
even asked if she was ‘encouraging’ Peter. It is often the case that victim behaviour can be 
constructed as ‘encouraging’. If we just briefly look at Susan’s behaviour where she spent time 
with Peter, he was in her home, and he was always in her life, the simplistic conclusion might be 
she wanted him there. However, Susan was clear over many years that she couldn’t get him out of 
her life, and that she was scared to death of him. Abusers maintain control through fear but this 
was not recognised by agencies. It was recognised by her friends and family. This phone call 
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raises a number of issues which are relevant to the analysis of this case. The officer was 
sympathetic, but sympathy on its own is not helpful, and sympathy does not make a victim safe.  
Susan’s safety strategy was to do whatever Peter told her to do, and to let him control her. She 
was just too scared to do anything else. She was not getting support or safety advice or help from 
the police or anyone else. She was probably right to appease Peter, as the criminal justice system 
was not helping her. No one attended to speak to her that night.  
10.33 An officer attended the next day and completed a DASH risk assessment. Susan was assessed as 
Standard Risk. There are three possible risk levels which come from such an interview, standard, 
medium and high. Standard is the lowest assessment. Comments from police that Peter was 
‘invited’ into her home suggest a fundamental misunderstanding of domestic abusers and 
domestic abuse victims. No DASH form can be located for this visit so it is not known how the 
assessment as standard risk was reached. This is a clear training issue. Susan was a very clear 
high risk victim. As we do not know how the RIC was filled out we cannot say whether Susan just 
failed to disclose the extent of the abuse, or the officer did not understand or ask the right 
questions. In hindsight we can say that she was high risk, so why didn’t the information get into 
the risk assessment? It could be lack of interviewing skills, lack of knowledge of domestic abuse, 
failure to take into consideration the fear directing the responses, or a number of other factors. 
10.34 When Peter reported Susan for benefit fraud the danger to her started to escalate. She was 
interviewed under caution three times with reference to this. These interviews contained 
disclosures of abuse. It was known to the interviewing council officers that the abuser was the 
person who reported the fraud, but this was not known to Susan. The fraud investigators were 
told in interviews under caution about the abuse and violence. Whilst it is recognised by the panel 
that the investigation was not completed at the time of Susan’s murder, the investigators made no 
comment in their IMR that Susan’s complaints would have had any impact on the decisions made 
about the fraud. This may well be a policy issue which may need addressing by all fraud 
investigation departments, as financial abuse is a significant factor in much domestic abuse.  
10.35 This chain of events prompted more unfortunate decisions which further distressed Susan. It was 
decided to stop Susan’s housing benefits and letters which threatened eviction were sent to her. 
This was at a time of failing health and an inability to work.  
10.36 The danger escalated seriously when Peter began to lose control of the situation and was 
informed that he would also be investigated for fraud. 
10.37 Peter inadvertently implicated himself in fraud, as he had received a sum of money from sale of 
the marital home which he had not declared. It appeared that towards the end of Susan’s life the 
impending investigation and its consequences were resting heavily on her. She had consulted her 
GP about the anxiety, depression and panic attacks she was experiencing and talked of her fear 
over the investigation. There is no reference at all in the GP notes of domestic abuse. Susan was 
very vocal in telling agencies about her problems with Peter, and it seems the only agency she did 
not disclose to was her GP surgery. We do not know if it was not discussed or was discussed but 
not put in the notes. The Surgery did not have this information.  
10.38 It seems also that Peter tried to retract his allegations on realising that he too would be 
investigated. He made calls from Susan’s home asking if anything could be done to stop the 
investigation. It seems that the impending fraud investigation was creating stress, albeit self-
inflicted, on Peter too. On the 7th May 2013 Peter was invited to an interview under caution to be 
held on the 14th May. He did not attend. It is well documented in much research that people who 
commit domestic abuse or violence which ends in homicide, are often controlling personalities 
who at the point of the homicide, had lost control of the victim or their lives in some way.   
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10.39 On (date removed for anonymity) 2013 Peter was in Susan’s flat. Susan had reported that he was 
gaining access by ringing the communal bell and being let in by her neighbours. 
10.40 At some point during that day or evening Peter hit Susan in the side of her head, then put his 
hands around her throat and squeezed, the post mortem report suggests that he would have 
squeezed for at least ten seconds. He killed Susan. 
10.41 It is alleged that he may have stayed overnight in the flat with Susan’s body. 
10.42 Susan’s body was discovered by police and relatives on the (date removed). Her body was lying in 
her bed, hidden by a duvet and pillow. 
10.43 After killing her, Peter took her car and sold it, and tried to make everyone believe that she was 
still alive. He had plans to flee the country again to try and evade prosecution for Susan’s murder. 
10.44 There are many high risk indicators in this case which have the potential to predict homicide. For 
example some of the most dangerous indicators are: Threats to kill, strangulation (or threat to 
life) assaults, sexual violence, coercive control, deep fear and intimidation in the victim. Stalking 
and harassment are also an issue in this case, but all these markers appeared to be largely 
invisible to agencies dealing with Susan. The family told of significant and high level stalking, 
some of which was reported to the police. For example, following her and then threatening 
anyone who spoke with her; taking her mobile phone; gaining covert access to her home; 
threatening and assaulting people behind her back to keep them away from her, and many more 
behaviours. These behaviours suggest that Susan was high risk for homicide and this is a clear 
training issue.  
10.45 Some individual officers and employees of other agencies spoke to Susan with sympathy, but 
consistently, nothing was really done about the abuse and violence. Police, whilst often showing a 
sympathetic response, were not successful in prosecuting Peter or giving real support to Susan to 
ensure that prosecution was a safe option for her or her family. Her health carers, including GPs 
and community nurses, also sympathetic to her numerous problems, do not record any 
disclosures from Susan, neither is it recorded whether they asked her about domestic abuse. 
Housing officers were often sympathetic, but did not offer a robust housing plan for her when she 
disclosed the abuse. It is also apparent that the seriousness of the abuse was not considered in the 
response to Peter’s accusations of fraud by Cheltenham Borough Council’s fraud investigation 
department. Susan only ever contacted domestic abuse services once and never went back.  
10.46 It seems that although agencies showed some sympathy, they did not offer a way out, or a way of 
making Susan safe. Also that sympathy did not mean they took her seriously. No-one really 
seemed to believe her life was in danger despite the numerous high risk characteristics in this 
case. This is clearly a training/awareness issue coupled with a lack of strong organisational 
policy. 
10.47 It is consistent across agencies that the abuser’s behaviour attracted little attention. In this case 
there was some evidence to suggest that Peter did not always observe warnings from police, or 
follow instructions in civil non molestation orders. However, there was also some evidence which 
suggests that he did not like the attention of authorities. For example, he tried to retract his 
accusation of benefit fraud when he realised he had implicated himself, he also tried to avoid 
police attention by going to Thailand, and he tried to manipulate police officers to avoid being 
considered an abuser, these behaviours suggest that a robust intervention could have had some 
effect. This includes the real threat of prosecution. This was not always followed through, and the 
rationalisation is often made in this case that there was insufficient evidence to continue. A 
dedicated domestic violence court staffed by experienced professionals may have given police 
and prosecutors more confidence that a conviction could be achieved, or given the victim 
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confidence that the abuse she suffered was not acceptable to society and the criminal justice 
system. 
10.48 Where Peter was getting away with abuse he continued, where he was not, he fled. 
10.49 There was not a consistent message given to Peter that his behaviour was unacceptable. He was 
getting away with it. 
10.50 Susan’s life was dominated by Peter and his need to control her. Certainly his actions were key in 
what happened to Susan in the last year of her life. Not only did he physically abuse her and 
control her daily activities, he exacted revenge on her through threats to her and her friends, and 
the allegations he made about her financial behaviour which resulted in a fraud investigation.  
10.51 There was some considerable discussion with the panel on the subject of Susan’s particular 
vulnerability. There are various definitions of vulnerability and organisations will adhere to those 
definitions which are relevant to their business. 
10.52 The panel considered whether certain organisations could have recognised Susan’s vulnerability 
and whether that might have changed any services she did or did not receive.  
10.53 The definition of vulnerable used by the NHS Trust did not fully fit Susan’s circumstances given 
the information at the time, in hindsight it could be considered that she did fit the definition. 
However, it is not necessarily the case that had she been considered vulnerable that this would 
have changed the services she was receiving in respect of domestic abuse. This is especially the 
case where health professionals did not appear to have disclosure of domestic abuse from Susan, 
or had not recorded it. 
10.54 The definition of vulnerable used by the police is similarly unclear, but Susan could have been 
considered as intimidated with reference to national guidelines. Domestic abuse victims who 
retract statements, and specifically say they are retracting because they are frightened, would 
now be considered as intimidated. 
10.55 The Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (Office for Criminal Justice Reform 2005) now places an 
obligation on the police to identify vulnerable or intimidated victims and to provide them with an 
enhanced service. Where vulnerable or intimidated victims are also witnesses, the code obliges 
police to explain the special measures set out in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
to them. The Witness Charter (Office for Criminal Justice Reform 2007) sets a similar standard for 
the police in respect of all witnesses.  
10.56 The guidance may or may not have had an impact on the service Susan received, but recognising 
and responding to victims who are too scared to pursue complaints with adherence to the 
guidance is now considered good practice. We are cognisant of the fact that that prior to 2006 
police would not have had any obligation to recognise Susan as intimidated, and that from 2006 
to 2013 the code was voluntary. 
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11.0 Good Practice and Early Recommendations 
11.1 At the very first meeting the panel considered if there were any recommendations which should 
be made quickly, and before the end of the process of the review. This was to efficiently and 
quickly implement any process which could help save lives. 
11.2 The panel considered that it was of importance that local agencies recognise the significance of 
strangulation or choking attempts when they happen in the context of domestic abuse. Research 
was considered which showed a correlation between such assaults and future homicide.  
11.3 As a result all panel members agreed to share this information with their agencies so that 
reported choking, drowning attempts, or strangulation could be considered in future cases of 
domestic abuse and be responded to as a serious and high risk behaviour.  
11.4 This review also recognises that a strangulation assault is not just an indicator of future serious 
assault, but is a serious assault in itself. Strangulation assault should be considered to include 
other life threatening assaults such as any choking, smothering, or attempts to drown the victim. 
11.5 It should also be noted that Gloucestershire Constabulary have developed procedures and 
policies since this homicide which are considered good and effective practice outside of the force 
area.  
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12.0 Conclusions 
12.1 Susan’s case reflects the experiences of many victims of domestic abuse in the sense that she 
experienced what might be termed ‘classic’ high risk abuse and control. It could also be said that 
she experienced many of the historically identified problems with accessing services and help. 
Susan did disclose abuse, but at the time of disclosure her complaints were not always recognised 
as serious. There appeared to be a lack of knowledge about domestic abuse and the way it is 
practiced in the agencies she had contact with. Susan had shown a remarkable amount of resolve 
to remove Peter from her life, she divorced him, she reported assaults, she identified herself to 
agencies as a victim of domestic abuse, she had pursued prosecutions, civil non-molestation 
orders, and had even had a panic alarm fitted in her home and entered refuges. She did all the 
things that victims of domestic abuse are advised to do. 
12.2 In conclusion this review considers that Susan’s death was predictable. There was 
consistent abuse, control, violence and stalking. Peter displayed nearly all of the 
commonly acknowledged high risk markers for committing homicide. The question of 
whether this homicide was preventable is more problematic. 
12.3 From a pragmatic viewpoint no agency received a call or had any information around the 
time of Susan’s death alerting them to the fact that there was an immediate threat to her 
life. From this perspective it cannot be concluded that any agency could have prevented 
Susan’s death on that night. 
12.4 From a wider perspective it is concluded that none of Susan’s actions resulted in the abuse 
ending. Most of the action that Susan took, she did without a great deal of help. Susan lost faith in 
the police and other agencies to help her when nothing changed, and Peter was not dissuaded 
from abusing her. Reporting and following prosecutions, or stopping him from having contact 
with her, were both dangerous and difficult. She became resigned to managing Peter alone and 
this is what she says to the police officer in the recorded call about a year and a half before her 
death, and also to investigating officers in her fraud interviews a couple of months before she 
died. She said no matter what she did nothing worked, nothing stopped Peter or the abuse. The 
distress and defeat in her voice were clear. 
12.5 Peter was controlling, abusive and violent. His behaviour was not addressed with any robust plan 
to encourage him to desist from his control of, and violence towards, Susan, or to punish him in a 
criminal justice context. He did not really have any reason to stop. Despite serious assaults he was 
able to continue with no sanction. It is interesting that when he was threatened with sanction he 
left the country, so clearly the thought of sanction alarmed him. When he was sentenced to life he 
became angry and aggressive in the court room and shouted at the judge. This suggests that the 
threat of sanction should be real and constant for abusers. 
12.6 The conclusions, in consideration of these observations, will rest on three premises which will 
guide the recommendations: 
i) That the victim should be encouraged and able to seek help that is effective 
ii) That the abuser should be challenged wherever possible with due consideration given to the 
ongoing safety of the victim 
iii) That if there is a good understanding of the seriousness of domestic abuse, and a clear 
pathway for responding, staff would be more competent and confident in their responses 
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12.7 Susan lived a much compromised life, as a result of her poor health, and the abuse, stalking and 
control she received from Peter. For future victims of domestic abuse the conclusion of this 
review is that the three premises above, when applied to an agency’s response may help victims 
feel more confident, help practitioners to respond with real help, and send a message to abusers 
that their behaviour won’t be tolerated. 
12.8 It is commented on a number of occasions by various agencies that Susan did not disclose, that 
she did not pursue prosecutions, and that she continued to have contact with Peter, as if she had 
free choice to choose to do otherwise. The failure to pursue prosecutions was because of fear, a 
very real and valid fear supported not only by Peter’s behaviour, but by extant international 
research.  
12.9 Susan did not have the free choice to do as she pleased; this is the product of domestic 
abuse. She was intimidated by Peter, and he controlled what she did. Consider that she variously 
reported to a number of people, beatings, strangulation, rape, threats to her life and that of her 
children and family and friends, assaults on her family in retribution for her actions, stalking, 
financial control, and homelessness. All these things were exacerbated by her failing health and 
terminal illness. 
12.10 In conclusions we should also consider the effect of inaction after complaints on Peter too. He 
committed some serious offences against Susan, his children, and the wider family. He was not 
seriously sanctioned or challenged by anyone. There was no clear message that his behaviour was 
unacceptable. He had no reason to seek help with his behaviour, or to desist.  
12.11 There are a number of learning points identified as arising from Susan’s story. It is important to 
remember that learning must go further than the DHR panel. Learning must be achieved by all 
individuals who work in any particular agency.  
12.12 Learning must also extend beyond gaining knowledge of particular legislation or agency 
procedure. Individuals must know why a certain procedure is in place so that it can be applied 
appropriately and effectively. Dissemination of the panel’s learning then is of the most crucial 
importance.  
12.13 The panel met to discuss dissemination of the recommendations and how learning could be 
cascaded. The Strategic Leadership group were included in this process and timetables for 
dissemination, and accountability were agreed. 
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13.0 Learning Points and Recommendations 
13.1 The recommendations in this report will adhere to the SMART model in that they are Specific, 
Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Timely. 
13.2 In completing their IMRs certain agencies addressed issues that were raised by this review and 
those agencies have made recommendations for themselves which will be implemented and 
audited by the processes of this review. The recommendations from individual agency learning 
are noted below. The benefit fraud department recommendations are somewhat included in the 
housing recommendations. The recommendations from the Healthcare Trust are contained 
within the scope of the overall recommendations made by the DHR panel. 
13.3 The individual recommendations from IMRs acknowledged by the review are: 
13.4 Gloucestershire Constabulary: Since this homicide occurred Gloucestershire Constabulary have 
made a number of changes to their domestic abuse policy and procedures. They were inspected in 
November 2013 as part of an HMIC nationwide inspection into responses to domestic abuse. 
When they were re-inspected in June 2014 they were considered to have greatly improved. There 
is now strong leadership in place in the area of public protection, and as a result changes have 
been made to policy and practice. Extra training was given to frontline officers and staff, and a 
stronger multi-agency co-operation. Specifically: 
 Within the MASH there are now daily triage meetings to discuss all the DA cases from the 
previous 24 hrs.  These meetings are between the police, Children’s Social Care and GDASS.  All 
aspects of risk are examined within the context of any current situation which allows fast-
tracking of cases where appropriate.  This is something both the Home Office and the 
Metropolitan Police are coming to see in practice as it is considered an innovative and practical 
solution. 
 The risk assessment tool (DASH) has been rolled into an intuitive process on a mobile 
platform;  this is called VIST (Vulnerability Identification Screening Tool).  It takes officers 
through key questions ensuring certain and important aspects are not missed, and that the 
voice of the victim is clearly heard.  Future development will be around automated recording 
and risk analysis. 
 They have developed a risk based approach to offender management in that a number of risks 
are scored to identify the top 20 DA offenders in the county.  The risks include for example, 
drugs/alcohol, mental health, children on a plan, repeat episodes, MARAC and so on.  As a result 
this allows the Constabulary to investigate DA cases based on potential harm and ensure, if 
appropriate, an evidenced based approach to support reluctant or frightened victims. 
 
In addition Gloucester Constabulary have made the following recommendations for themselves in their 
management review: 
1. 
The force to advocate and 
include in policy that a high 
risk marker/flag should be 
recorded against a High Risk 
offender who has come to 
the attention of police 
through a DA incident where 
strangulation is alleged. 
 
Strangulation is recognised as a key indicator of High Risk. 
Where a perpetrator is identified as High Risk, an appropriate 
marker will be recorded against that individual’s nominal 
record – citing relevant high risk factors that relate to that 
person, e.g., strangulation, use of weapons etc.  The ‘flag’ will 
remain attached to that individual. (CAADA recommend that the 
marker is removed after 12 months if no other incidents are 
reported) 
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2. 
Create a force system to 
enable quick and easy access 
to relevant safeguarding 
information and record of 
risks. 
The current system is deemed sufficient to alert officers to the 
level of risk in respect of the victim. The creation of the new 
module will enable additional risk warnings and risk 
management plans to be linked directly to a victim and to be 
accessible.  
 
3. 
The force to ensure that the 
completion and quality 
assurance of DASH forms are 
an ongoing priority with 
results reported to 
Performance group for 
scrutiny. 
Safeguarding is a force priority and domestic abuse forms part 
of this. The quality of and the compliance rate of DASH remains 
a key performance indicator which is scrutinised each month at 
the Performance Operations Meeting. The How-To Guide makes 
it very clear that officers and their supervisors have a 
responsibility to ensure clarity of information. (The How-to 
guide is a comprehensive guide to force policy and procedure on 
domestic abuse) 
4.  
The force to ensure that 
training continues within the 
Constabulary in respect of 
Domestic Abuse, Stalking and 
Harassment.  
 
Link to HMIC recommendation 7 where updates will be 
recorded 
5. 
Create force system where 
the risk factors affecting 
vulnerability can be easily 
captured and recorded 
A task & finish group has already been established to capture 
the risks posed to all vulnerable persons, with a view to 
ensuring that all risk management plans are located on one 
database and are accessible to all operational staff. 
 
6. 
The force to reinforce the 
Victim Code compliance 
 
This is a force issue and is subject to regular bulletin entries 
7.  
The force to remind officers 
that the investigative process 
and the dialogue with CPS for 
allegations of strangulation 
is fundamental  
 
It is not possible to establish a definitive guidance document in 
relation to the classification of offences where strangulation has 
occurred. The evidence that may exist is very much dependent 
on a case-by-case basis and dialogue / consultation with CPS is 
necessary in all cases prior to charge. 
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13.5 Cheltenham Borough Homes: 
a) A Domestic Abuse Forum will be set up with a lead manager from CBH to chair the 
Forum and drive improvements.  
b) The Forum will produce policies and procedures that will be ratified at their 
Management and Board.  
c) The Forum will meet regularly but as a minimum every other month. 
d) The Forum will identify and ensure delivery of training, both at an enhanced level and 
an awareness level that will be rolled out to all CBH staff. 
e) The Forum will produce and monitor DA statistics.  
f) The Forum will link to MAPPA, MARAC, GDASS and any other best practice 
organisations.  
g) The Forum will deliver an Action Plan that will encompass the Learning Points above 
and any other defined work that is required.  
h) The Forum will review its work on an annual basis. 
i) The Forum will incorporate these ideals into their Terms of Reference.  
 
13.6 In addition there are the specific recommendations of the review panel which fall into two 
categories; focused and general. This is because the process of the review highlighted that there 
was some fragmentation in the approach to domestic abuse across agencies, and it was felt that a 
set of recommendations which could be considered as generally relevant to all organisations 
would create a more consistent and shared approach that would benefit the people of 
Cheltenham and Gloucestershire. However, there are some recommendations which are focused 
on particular organisations. 
13.7 The panel also concluded that good policy will better succeed if the basic knowledge for the 
reasons for that policy are disseminated along with the policy itself.  
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General learning points and recommendations: 
Learning Point 1: The review found that there is no consistency across Gloucestershire in its 
approach to domestic abuse. Some organisations did not have a policy at all. The panel felt that 
this was something that should be addressed so that employees were knowledgeable and 
confident in their approach to domestic abuse, and that victims would experience consistency to 
build trust. In addition, the panel found that the way information was shared between agencies 
created fragmentation in the knowledge of Susan’s circumstances. Had more been shared and 
known Susan may have received better support. This was made clear when she applied for 
housing for example. 
 
Recommendation 1 
Each public-sector agency that is represented on the DHR panel and on Cheltenham 
Strategic Leadership Group (SLG), will adopt a domestic abuse policy and procedures, 
based on a county-wide template, to guide how their agencies responds to domestic 
abuse and stalking. VCS agencies will also be encouraged to adopt a domestic abuse 
policy. 
 
This will guide how their agency responds to domestic abuse and stalking. VCS agencies will be 
encouraged to adopt a domestic abuse policy. As part of the development of the policy, it is 
suggested that there be encouragement for victims to consistently disclose their domestic abuse 
to all agencies they come into contact with. Domestic abuse is a course of conduct problem, and 
needs to be dealt with considering this. In a course of conduct offence a log should be kept of all 
‘incidents’ or behaviours. Domestic abuse victims are currently only encouraged to keep a log in 
incidents of stalking.  
 
This panel also recognise that it may be dangerous for a victim to keep any log with themselves. 
In consideration of this the panel felt that victims could be encouraged to make an information 
trail for their own benefit, by disclosing to agencies who would then make a record, so that in 
the future there is evidence of their domestic abuse. When a disclosure of abuse is made for a 
specific purpose like a housing application for example, the agency will often seek corroboration 
or evidence of the assertion.  The panel cross referenced this recommendation to 
recommendation 3, which is to use staff training to encourage disclosure. 
  
It is also observed that encouraging victims to disclose safely, does not remove any 
responsibility on agencies to share information when safe and appropriate. The panel also note 
that this recommendation could be seen to be placing responsibility on the shoulders of victims, 
we recognise this critique, but feel that whilst information sharing is so fraught with problems, 
that it may be safer to take account of those difficulties and help victims create a trail in 
partnership with agencies.  
 
To ensure that there is consistency in the way the policies operate, and the fact that the majority 
of these agencies operate on a county-wide basis, it is suggested that the Gloucestershire 
Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence Commissioning Group defines the core elements of the 
county-wide template that each agency can adapt to include their own procedures detailing 
their approach and response to disclosures of domestic abuse by service users or their 
employees. The policy template will be produced by December 2017. It will be the responsibility 
of each agency to add their procedure guidance to the document by June 2017. 
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Learning Point 2: with reference to LP1, the panel felt that if consistency of approach to domestic 
abuse would benefit victims and employees, then that consistency should stretch to those 
agencies and businesses that are contracted to provide public-facing services. 
Recommendation 2 
There will be a requirement that selected agencies delivering public-facing services on 
behalf of public sector partners have a domestic abuse policy. 
 
The Strategic County Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence Coordinator will explore the 
possibility of how procuring and tendering services could include an obligation on providers to 
illustrate that they have a domestic abuse policy in place. The county will forge links with other 
areas that are progressing similar work, including Brighton and Hove Council. This 
recommendation will be followed up by the Cheltenham Strategic Leadership Group. 
 
Learning Point 3: The panel observed that victims of domestic abuse should know that 
Gloucestershire agencies and their partners take domestic abuse seriously. In this case it 
seemed that Susan had lost faith in the agencies who were supposed to help. There is therefore a 
need to train staff across agencies to create a consistent message for victims 
Recommendation 3 
A training needs analysis will be coordinated by the GDASVIG and a plan developed for 
how to roll out training across agencies. 
 
The panel feels that there is a need to train staff across agencies to create a consistent message 
for victims. It is important that all frontline professionals recognise that domestic abuse and 
stalking are dangerous, and they should always take disclosure seriously. Ongoing training 
needs to be integrated into the domestic abuse policy. Awareness that domestic abuse can be 
dangerous and should be taken seriously should be part of all staff training, including senior 
managers. This should include GPs and community nurses.  
 
The Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence Commissioning Group will absorb this 
recommendation into the second strategic objective of the strategy whereby a training needs 
analysis across the partnership will be explored to implement these changes. 
 
This needs analysis will be coordinated by the DASVCG 
 
Learning Point 4:  The review highlighted that public awareness of domestic abuse and how and 
where to find support did not appear to be high. Susan’s family and friends were often abused by 
Peter, but local services were not used 
Recommendation 4 
An awareness campaign implemented using the branding of the local domestic abuse 
specialist agency and the glostakeastand website to raise awareness. 
 
The GDASS ‘daisy’ should be a visible reminder of the help available as well as the 
glostakeastand website and branding. This awareness campaign could coincide with 
implementation of the countywide domestic abuse policy. This particular recommendation will 
be coordinated by the Strategic County Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence Coordinator and 
the DASVCG. 
 
Recommendations 1 to 4 together create a model for a consistent approach to domestic abuse in 
Gloucestershire, that is: a shared domestic abuse policy; a requirement that any agency dealing with 
public sector partners should have a domestic abuse policy; that a comprehensive training needs 
analysis is completed, and training delivered across all agencies and staff; use of county agencies and 
branding to indicate the shared policy and encourage and remind victims to disclose; an awareness 
campaign supported by local media to let everyone know about the GDASS daisy and the glostakeastand 
website. 
 40 | P a g e  
 
Learning Point 5: A trial is a public event, and the transcript and narratives should reflect 
reality. The chair observed on attending the trial that the prosecution’s opening statement 
reflected some damaging beliefs. The panel considered that all agencies should be aware of the 
way domestic abuse is practised, and especially those who have a public voice which stays on 
record, and may influence wider beliefs. 
 
Recommendation 5 
As a trial is a public event and is retained in public records it should reflect reality, it is 
recommended that CPS prosecutors in domestic homicide cases and Magistrates have 
training in recognising the practices of coercive control, stalking and domestic abuse. 
 
A better understanding of domestic abuse could then have a place in the forensic narrative and 
form part of the official understanding of what happened in individual cases where domestic 
abuse is relevant. Invitations to train with other agencies will be given to local CPS prosecutors 
and CPS direct call handlers. The CPS acknowledged a need for better understanding in their 
staff and welcomed the invitations. It is hoped the invitations will be accepted. 
 
Learning Point 6: The panel recognised that Susan was a vulnerable person in common thinking, 
in that she was physically frail, suffering a terminal illness, receiving constant community 
support for her health, and often homeless. However, she was not considered vulnerable in 
different organisational definitions. The panel considered however, that she was intimidated, 
both in common thinking, and in official definitions of intimidation. 
 
Recommendation 6 
It is a responsibility of the police to identify vulnerable and intimidated witnesses and 
respond accordingly.  
 
The official guidance, which now places a responsibility on police officers to identify intimidated 
witnesses and victims set out in the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (Office for Criminal 
Justice Reform 2005), should be common knowledge and in common practice. Most, if not all, 
domestic abuse victims are intimidated even if they do not fall fully within the definition. It may 
be good practice in cases of domestic abuse, especially where a victim or witness retracts a 
statement, or is known to have done this before, that police consistently make use of the 
approach set out in the official guidance. There is a copy of this guidance published on the 
Gloucestershire Constabulary website. We do not suggest that Gloucestershire Police do not 
observe this responsibility but wish to underline the importance of it in this report for the 
police, and partner agencies like the CPS. 
 
Learning Point 7: It was found that the help Susan received from health services appeared to 
focus solely on her physical problems. At least one agency which had care of Susan had no 
domestic abuse policy, and all health agencies which supplied information to this panel did not 
make good notes about the abuse Susan was suffering, or its impact on her health and wellbeing. 
This could be because of poor practice in recording, or because Susan did not disclose. Either 
way there is learning that domestic abuse is relevant to health and wellbeing, and that Susan 
should have been encouraged to talk about this aspect of her life with carers, especially with her 
GP. Susan disclosed anxiety and depression in the year before her death, specifically related to 
the fraud investigation and financial abuse, yet there is nothing in her notes to suggest domestic 
abuse. 
Recommendation 7: 
All health practitioners and professionals should consider Routine Enquiry in cases 
where depression or anxiety, or any condition potentially related to domestic abuse, is 
discussed with a patient. 
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It was found that Susan did not disclose domestic abuse to GPs or community nurses, despite 
disclosing to other agencies. Routine Enquiry is used widely in a health setting and research has 
shown that victims respond well to it in a health environment. This is also related to achieving 
recommendations 1, 3 and 4. It is recommended that in implementing the county domestic 
abuse policy, GP practices consider Routine Enquiry as standard in cases of anxiety, depression 
and traumatic injury, or other complaints and problems which could be linked to domestic 
abuse. This recommendation should fall into the training needs analysis from recommendation 
3. There is also a software and training package specifically for GPs known as IRIS which 
supports GPs through a decision making process in cases of domestic abuse. 
 
Learning Point 8: Financial abuse is more probable, than merely possible, in cases of domestic 
abuse where there is coercion and control. The panel felt that training for fraud investigators 
especially, in financial abuse would benefit victims. 
 
Recommendation 8 
Benefit Fraud investigators should be aware that in cases where coercive control is 
exercised that financial abuse and control of the victim’s finances is more probable than 
possible and should therefore be trained in domestic abuse and have enhanced training 
in financial abuse. 
 
Any accusations by the victim of domestic abuse and control of their finances by an abusive 
partner should be taken seriously and considered as relevant to the investigation. It is 
recommended that fraud investigators employed by Cheltenham Borough Council have training 
in recognising domestic abuse, coercion and control, and in particular financial abuse. This is 
also covered in the countywide strategy for training needs analysis in recommendation 3. 
 
Learning Point 9: It is possible that had Susan been assessed as a high risk victim of domestic 
abuse using the DASH Risk Identification Checklist (which has been adopted by Gloucestershire 
Police), she may have received crucial help and a safety plan. Susan was high risk and could have 
benefited from being referred to MARAC.  
 
Recommendation 9 
This is a two-point recommendation 
 
All agencies should have identified individuals who are competent in identifying 
risk factors and understanding their significance (eg strangulation) 
 
More agencies need to be trained including: 
 Social care 
 Housing 
 Probation 
 Local councils 
 Benefits Agencies 
 Health Agencies 
 
Learning Point 10: In this case it was found that the behaviour of the perpetrator was not 
robustly addressed by the police. It was considered that recognising the high risk an abuser 
poses should be partnered with focus on the abuser. This recommendation also considers 
comments made by the CPS about the need for good evidence gathering. 
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Recommendation 10 
Police should use their professional judgement and consider all options available to them 
when attending calls for help in cases of domestic abuse.  
The police have a number of actions available to them, all of which would be aided by 
meticulous evidence gathering at the time. The use of evidence gathering aides, such as body 
worn cameras should be discussed at the next available Public Protection Service Delivery 
Board. Specific guidance on new legislation which focuses on course of conduct offending and 
evidence gathering should also be discussed.  
 
Learning Point 11: The Domestic Abuse Courts are no longer staffed by specially trained 
individuals and this could be having an effect on the victim’s faith in the system. This may 
become crucial in effectively prosecuting the new coercion and control offences in the Serious 
Crimes Act 2015. 
 
Recommendation 11 
The specialist domestic abuse court should be staffed by professionals with enhanced 
training in domestic abuse and coercive control. This would include the prosecutors, 
magistrates, judges and supporting personnel. 
 
Learning Point 12: There was no support offered to the children in this case, in fact their 
potential suffering was missed by health and law enforcement agencies. 
 
Recommendation 12 
There should be an assessment of the needs of children and young people where 
Domestic Abuse has occurred and this should be part of any risk assessment. It is 
considered that there is a need for specialist group and individual programmes which 
would support children witnessing or affected by domestic abuse. This review 
recommends that local agencies are supported in bidding for funding to begin developing 
such support for children. 
 
It is considered that there is a need for specialist group and individual programmes which 
would support children witnessing, or affected by, domestic abuse. This review recommends 
that local agencies are supported in bidding for funding to begin developing such support for 
children. Specifically this recommendation could be explored by GDASS and Infobuzz with the 
support of the OPCC and the DASVCG. Infobuzz have staff trained to deliver specific domestic 
abuse programmes to children, and have those programmes ready to deliver. This would only 
take some funding to start. It may also be timely to consider nurturing circles or inclusion of 
domestic abuse in the school PSHE curriculum. It appears that schools develop and design their 
own PSHE curriculum, so encouragement to provide more support to children by schools should 
be given. 
 
Cheltenham Strategic Leadership Group requires that all recommendations contained in agency 
IMRs be fully implemented and that agencies evidence that action has been taken to implement 
all recommendations to the panel. This should be done before the publication of this report. It is 
recognised that some recommendations will take time to complete, but the action plan should 
be in process before the panel disbands, and will be subject to future scrutiny by the Strategic 
Leadership Group. 
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Appendix 1 
Learning Point Recommendation Timescale 
1. There is no consistency 
across the county in 
responding to domestic 
abuse 
Each public-sector agency that is represented 
on the DHR panel and on Cheltenham Strategic 
Leadership Group (SLG), will adopt a domestic 
abuse policy and procedures, based on a 
county-wide template, to guide how their 
agencies responds to domestic abuse and 
stalking. VCS agencies will be encouraged to 
adopt a domestic abuse policy. 
 
Adoption of Concordat 
by agencies by March 
2017  
2. Consistency should 
stretch to provider 
agencies contracted to 
deliver public-facing 
services 
There will be a requirement that selected 
agencies delivering public-facing services on 
behalf of public sector partners have a domestic 
abuse policy 
Adoption of standard 
clauses by March 2017 
3. There is a need to train 
staff across agencies to 
create a consistent 
message for victims 
A training needs analysis will be coordinated by 
the GDASVIG and a plan developed for how to 
roll out training across agencies 
March 2017 
4. Local people were not 
aware of the help 
available to them 
An awareness campaign implemented using the 
branding of the local domestic abuse specialist 
agency and the glostakeastand website to raise 
awareness. 
November 2016 
5. There is not a 
sufficiently wide 
understanding of how 
domestic abuse is 
practised and as such 
damaging beliefs can be 
reflected and left 
unchallenged in the 
criminal justice process. 
As a trial is a public event and is retained in 
public records it should reflect reality, it is 
recommended that CPS prosecutors in domestic 
homicide cases and Magistrates have training in 
recognising the practices of coercive control, 
stalking and domestic abuse 
With immediate effect 
6. Vulnerable and 
intimidated witnesses 
were not always 
identified or special 
measures applied for by 
the CPS in court 
proceedings 
It is a responsibility of the police to identify 
vulnerable and intimidated witnesses and 
respond accordingly 
Ongoing 
7. Those responsible for 
Susan’s health and 
wellbeing did not follow 
up signs of domestic 
abuse 
 
 
All health practitioners and professionals 
should consider Routine Enquiry in cases where 
depression or anxiety, or any condition 
potentially related to domestic abuse, is 
discussed with a patient 
March 2017 
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8. Benefit Fraud 
investigators did not 
consider financial abuse 
or control 
Benefit Fraud investigators should be aware 
that in cases where coercive control is exercised 
that financial abuse and control of the victim’s 
finances is more probable than possible and 
should therefore be trained in domestic abuse 
and have enhanced training in financial abuse. 
March 2017 
9. An effective risk 
assessment was not 
performed 
All agencies should have identified individuals 
who are competent in identifying risk factors 
and understanding their significance (eg 
strangulation) 
 
More agencies need to be trained including: 
• Social care 
• Housing 
• Probation 
• Local councils 
• Benefits Agencies 
• Health Agencies 
June 2017 
10. Perpetrator behaviour 
is not robustly 
challenged 
Police should use their professional judgement 
and consider all options available to them when 
attending calls for help in cases of domestic 
abuse. The police have a number of actions 
available to them, all of which would be aided 
by meticulous evidence gathering at the time. 
The use of evidence gathering aides, such as 
body worn cameras should be discussed within 
the Constabulary 
Ongoing 
11. The domestic abuse 
court in Cheltenham is 
not staffed by trained 
individuals any more 
The specialist domestic abuse court should be 
staffed by professionals with enhanced training 
in domestic abuse and coercive control. This 
would include the prosecutors, magistrates, 
judges and supporting personnel. 
June 2017 
12. There is a lack of 
specialist support for 
children affected by 
domestic abuse 
There should be an assessment of the needs of 
children and young people where Domestic 
Abuse has occurred and this should be part of 
any risk assessment. It is considered that there 
is a need for specialist group and individual 
programmes which would support children 
witnessing or affected by domestic abuse. This 
review recommends that local agencies are 
supported in bidding for funding to begin 
developing such support for children. 
June 2017 
13. Strangulation - Early 
Recommendation 
All local agencies recognise the significance of 
strangulation or choking attempts when they 
happen in the context of domestic abuse. 
Research was considered which showed a 
correlation between such assaults and future 
homicide 
Complete 
 
